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Abstract. The paper deals with the problem of logical adequacy of language knowl-
edge with cognition of reality. A logical explication of the concept of language knowledge
conceived of as a kind of codified knowledge is taken into account in the paper. Formal
considerations regarding the notions of meta-knowledge (logical knowledge about language
knowledge) and truth are developed in the spirit of some ideas presented in the author’s
earlier papers (1991, 1998, 2001a,b, 2007a,b,c) treating about the notions of meaning,
denotation and truthfulness of well-formed expressions (wfes) of any given categorial lan-
guage. Three aspects connected with knowledge codified in language are considered, in-
cluding: 1) syntax and two kinds of semantics: intensional and extensional, 2) three kinds
of non-standard language models and 3) three notions of truthfulness of wfes. Adequacy
of language knowledge to cognitive objects is understood as an agreement of truthfulness
of sentences in these three models.
Keywords: Meta-knowledge, categorial syntax, meaning, denotation, categorial semantics,
nonstandard models, truthfulness, language knowledge adequacy.
Introduction
It is commonly realized that the term ‘knowledge’ is ambiguous. Speaking
about knowledge, we disregard psychological knowledge offered through unit
cognition, although it is from knowledge of that sort that verbal knowledge
codified by means of language arose. Knowledge will be understood as an
inter-subjective knowledge preserved in language, where it is formed and
transferred to others in cognitive-communicative acts. Representation of
this knowledge is regarded as language knowledge.
For our purposes, in this paper we will consider three aspects of language
knowledge: one syntactic and two semantic ones: intensional and exten-
sional. The main aim of the paper is to answer the following well-known,
classical philosophical problem:
When is our language knowledge in agreement with our cognition
of reality?
David Makinson, Jacek Malinowski and Heinrich Wansing (eds.),
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In this paper, the problem is considered from a logical and mathemat-
ical perspective and is called: the problem of logical adequacy of language
knowledge. We will consider it as:
1) an adequacy of syntax and two kinds of semantics,
2) concord between syntactic forms of language expressions and their two
correlates: meanings and denotations, and
3) an agreement of three notions of truth: one syntactic and two semantic
ones.
The main ideas of our approach to meta-knowledge (logical knowledge
about language knowledge) and truthfulness of sentences in which knowl-
edge is encoded will be outlined in Section 1. In Section 2 we will give the
main assumptions of a formal-logical theory of syntax and semantics which
are the basis for theoretical considerations, and in Section 3 we will define
three notions of truthfulness of sentences. The paper ends with Section 4
containing a formulation of a general condition for adequacy of language
knowledge with regard to these notions.
⋆ ⋆ ⋆
The paper is a result of many years of research conducted by the author
and a summary of results obtained earlier [47–58]. The synthetic charac-
ter of the article provides a strong motivation for the conceptual apparatus
introduced further. The apparatus employs some formal-logical and mathe-
matical tools. The synthesis being produced does not always allow detailed,
verbal descriptions of particular formal fragments of the paper; nor can it
allow for development of some formal parts. The author does, however, be-
lieve that the principal ideas and considerations in the paper will be clear to
the reader.
1. Ideas
The notion of meta-knowledge is connected with the relationships defined by
the triad: language-cognition-reality (see Figure 1 ).
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Figure 1.
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Three different aspects, representing cognitively independent factors, are
taken into account at constituting any language L as a tool of communication
in which knowledge is formed and transmitted. They are: syntactic, semantic
and pragmatic factors.
Reliability of cognition of reality by means of language L and truthful-
ness of its sentences are given by an agreement of syntactic and two kinds
of (intensional and extensional) semantic knowledge, which correspond to
three levels of knowledge about the components of the triad (cf. Wybraniec-
Skardowska 2007c).
According to Figure 1, following Frege [17], Husserl [25] and other mod-
ern followers of gramatica speculativa, the meta-knowledge is the knowledge
referring to three realities (spaces):
1. language reality S (the set of all well-formed expressions of L), in which
results of cognitive activities such as concepts and propositions are ex-
pressed,
2. conceptual reality C, in which products of cognition of ordinary reality
such as logical concepts and logical propositions (meanings of language
expressions) are considered, and
3. ontological reality O which contains objects of cognition, among others,
denotations of language expressions.
Applying the terms: ‘lanuage reality’, ‘conceptual reality’ and ‘ontolog-
ical reality’ we aim at distinguishing some models of language L which are
necessary to define three different notions of truthfulness of its sentences.
Thus, we depart from the classical notion of ‘Reality’ as an object of cogni-
tive research. In particular, speaking further about indexation reality I , we
mean certain metalinguistic space of objects (indices) serving the purpose
of indication of categories of expressions of S , categories of conceptual ob-
jects of C and ontological categories of objects of O . The reality I forms
categorial skeleton of language, conceptual and ontological realities.
Theoretical considerations are based on:
• syntax – describing language reality S related to L,
and two kinds of semantics:
• intensional (conceptual) semantics – comprising the relationship be-
tween S and cognition – describing conceptual reality C , and
• extensional (denotational) semantics – describing the relationships
between L and ordinary reality – ontological reality O to which the
language refers (see Wybraniec-Skardowska 1991, 1998, 2007a, b, c).
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The theoretical considerations take into account the adequacy of the
syntax and two kinds of semantics of language L.
The language reality S is described by a theory of categorial syntax
and the conceptual and ontological realities by its expansion to a theory
of categorial semantics in which we can consider three kinds of models of L:
• one syntactic
and
• two semantic (intensional and extensional).
For these models we can define three notions of truthfulness:
• one syntactic
and
• two semantic employing the notion of meaning (intension) and the notion
of denotation (extension), respectively.
2. Main Assumptions of the Theory of Syntax and Semantics
2.1. Categorial Syntax and Categorial Semantics
Any syntactically characterized language L is fixed if the set S of all well-
formed expressions (briefly wfes) is determined. L is given here on the type-
level, where all wfes of S are treated as expression-types, i.e. some classes
of concrete, material, physical, identifiable expression-tokens used in defi-
nite linguistic-situational contexts. Hence, wefs of S are here abstract ideal
syntactic units of L1.
Language L can be exactly defined as a categorial language, i.e. language
in which wfes are generated by a categorial grammar whose idea goes back
to Ajdukiewicz (1935) and Polish tradition, and has a very long history2.
Language L at the same time may be regarded as a linguistic scheme of
1Let us note that the differentiation token-type for linguistic objects originates from
Charles Sanders Peirce (1931-1935). A formal theory of syntax based on this distinction
is given in [49] and [51].
2The notion of categorial grammar originated from Ajdukiewicz (1935, 1960) was
shaped by Bar-Hillel (1950, 1953, 1964). It was constructed under influence of Leśniewski’s
theory of semantic (syntactic) categories in his protothetics and ontology systems (1929,
1930), under Husserl’s ideas of pure grammar (1900-1901), and under the influence of
Russell’s theory of logical types. The notion was considered by many authors: Lambek
(1958, 1961), Montague (1970, 1974), Cresswell (1973, 1977), Buszkowski (1988, 1989),
Marciszewski (1988), Simons (1989) and others. In this paper language L is generated
by the so-called classical categorial grammar, the notion introduced and explicated by
Buszkowski (1988, 1989) and the author (1985, 1989, 1991).
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ontological reality O , keeping with Frege’s ontological canons (1884), and of
conceptual reality C .
Considerations are formalized on the ground of author’s general formal-
logical theory of categorial syntax and categorial semantics (1985, 1991,
1998, 1999, 2001a,b, 2006).
Every compound expression of L has a functor-argument structure
and both it and its constituents (the main part – the main functor and its
complementary parts – arguments of that functor) have determined:
• the syntactic, the conceptual and the ontological categories defined by the
functions ιL, ιC , ιO of the indications of categorial indices assigned to
them, respectively,
• meanings (intensions), defined by the meaning operation µ,
• denotations (extensions), defined by the denotation operation δ.
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Figure 2.
It should be underlined that since wefs of S are understood as some
abstract syntactic units of L, meanings of wfes are not their mental signifi-
cation and denotations of wfes are not the same as object references of their
concrete, material expression-tokens (cf. [57]).
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2.2. Three referential relationships of wfes
We will concentrate on three referential relationships of wfes of S to three
realities to which wfes refer:
• one syntactic: metalinguistic relationship connected with the above-men-
tioned indexation reality I, and
• two semantic: conceptual (intensional) and denotational (exten-
sional) relationships connected with realities C and O, respectively.
These relationships are illustrated in Figure 2.
2.3. Categorial indices
The theory of categorial syntax is a theory formalising the basic principles
of Leśniewski’s theory of semantic (syntactic) categories (1929, 1930) im-
proved by Ajdukiewicz (1935) by introducing categorial indices assigned to
expressions of language L.
Categorial indices belong to the indexation reality I and are metalan-
guage expressions corresponding to expressions of language L. They serve to
defining the set S of all wfes of L. The set S is defined according to the
principle (SC) of syntactic connection referring to Ajdukiewicz’s approach
(1935).
(SC) is the rule establishing the correspondence between the index of any
functor-argument expression of L and indices: the index of its main functor
and indices of its successive arguments. It states that:
(SC) The index of the main functor of a functor-argument expression is
a complex (functoral) index formed of the index of that expression and the
successive indices of the successive arguments of that functor.
2.4. Syntactic Operations
In the theory the functions: ιL, ιC , ιO of the indications of categorial indices
are certain syntactic operations from reality S or fragments of realties C and
O into reality I, respectively, i.e.
• the syntactic operation ιL : S→I,
• the ontological syntactic partial operation ιO : O→I,
• the conceptual syntactic partial operation ιC : C→I.
Categorial indices of I also serve to indicate syntactic, conceptual (in-
tensional) and ontological (denotational) categories. These categories are
included in realities S, C and O, respectively.
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If ξ ∈I then these categories are defined, respectively, as follows:
(1) Catξ = {e ∈S : ιL(e) = ξ},
(2) Conξ = {c ∈C : ιC(c) = ξ},
(3) Ontξ = {o ∈O : ιO(o) = ξ}.
In order to define semantic categories indicated by categorial indices, and
also by conceptual and ontological categories, we have to take into consider-
ation two semantic relationships and use some semantic operations.
2.5. Semantic Operations
In the theory of categorial semantics such notions as meaning and deno-
tation of a wfe of L are considered.
As it was illustrated in Figure 2 we consider three semantic operations
defining meanings and denotations of wfes:
• the meaning operation µ : S→C,
• the denotation operation δ : S→O,
• the conceptual denotation operation δC : C→O.
Let us note that the semantic functions: µ, δ and δC, are defined on ab-
stract objects of S (on wfes-types) and of C (on meanings: logical concepts,
logical propositions, operations on them, operations on these operations and
so on), respectively.
The notion of meaning as a value of the meaning operation µ on any
wfe of L is a semantic-pragmatic one and it is defined as a manner of using
wfes of L by its users in connection to the concept of meaning deriving
from L. Wittgenstein (1953) and, independently, from K. Ajdukiewicz (1931,
1934); see Wybraniec-Skardowska (2005, 2007 a,b). So, the notion of meaning
of any wfe of L is an abstract entity.
We take the standpoint that any wfe-type of S has an established meaning
which determines its denotation, even if such an expression is understood as
an indexical one in natural language (e.g. ‘he’, ‘this’, ‘today’) 3. In this sense
3For example, let us note that the word-type ‘today’ understood as a class of all word-
tokens identifiable with the word-token:
today
does not have a fixed meaning, but each of its sub-types consisting of identifiable tokens
(utterances) of the word-type ‘today’ formulated on a given day is a meaningful wfe-type
of English and determines by itself a denotation that is this day.
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the approach presented here agrees with the classical Aristotelian position
that the context has to be included somehow in the meaning; the manner of
using wfes of L is in a way built into the meaning (cf. [57]).
The notion of meaning is differentiated from the notion of denotation
in accordance with the distinction of G. Frege (1892) Sinn and Bedeutung
and R. Carnap’s distinction intension-extension (1947).
The denotation operation δ is defined as the composition of the operation
µ and the operation δC of conceptual denotation, i.e.
(δC) δ(e) = δC(µ(e)) for any e ∈ S.
So, we assume that denotation of the wfe e is determined by its meaning
µ(e) and it is the value of the function δC of conceptual denotation for µ(e).
Hence, we can state that:
If two wfes have the same meaning then they have the same denotation.
Formally:
Fact 1. µ(e) = µ(e′) ⇒ δ(e) = δ(e′), for any e, e′ ∈ S.
It is well-known that the converse implication does not hold. So, the
operation δC shows that something can differ meaning from denotation.
2.6. Knowledge and Cognitive Objects
The image µ(S) of S determined by the meaning operation µ is a fragment
of conceptual reality C and includes all meanings of wfes of language L,
so all components of knowledge (logical notions, logical propositions and
operations between them, operations on the latter, and so on) and can be re-
garded as knowledge of relatively stable users of L about reality O , codified
by means of wfes of L.
The image δ(S) of S determined by the denotation operation δ is a
fragment of ontological reality O and includes all denotations of wfes of
language L, so all objects of cognition of O (things, states of things and
operations between them) in cognitive-communicative process of cognition
of reality O by relatively stable users of L.
We differentiate two kinds of semantic categories: intensional and exten-
sional.
(4) Intξ = {e ∈ S : µ(e) ∈ Conξ}.
(5) Extξ = {e ∈ S : δ(e) ∈ Ontξ}.
So, intensional categories consist of all wfes whose meanings belong to
suitable conceptual categories, while extensional categories consist of all wfes
whose denotations belong to suitable conceptual categories.
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Adequacy of syntax and semantics required the syntactic and semantic
agreement of wfes of L.
2.7. The principles of categorial agreement
In accordance with Frege’s-Husserl’s-Leśniewski’s and Suszko’s understand-
ing of the adequacy of syntax and semantics of language L, syntactic and se-
mantic (intensional and extensional) categories with the same index should
be the same (see Frege, 1879, 1892; Husserl, 1900-1901; Leśniewski, 1929,
1930; Suszko, 1958, 1960, 1964, 1968).
This correspondence of the categorial agreement (denoted by (CA1 )
and (CA2 )) – is here postulated by means of categorial indices that are the
tool of coordination of language expressions and by two kinds of references
that are assigned to them:
(CA1 ) Catξ = Intξ.
(CA2 ) Catξ = Extξ.
From (1)–(5) and (CA1 ), (CA2 ) we get the following variants of the
principles:
For any wfe e
(C’A1 ) e ∈ Catξ iff µ(e) ∈ Conξ.
(C’A2 ) e ∈ Catξ iff δ(e) ∈ Ontξ.
(CA3 ) ιL(e) = ιC(µ(e)) = ιO(δ(e)).
The condition (C’A2 ) is called the principle of categorial agreement
and it is a formal notation the principle originated by Suszko (1958, 1960,
1964; cf. also Stanosz and Nowaczyk 1976).
So, according to innovative Frege’s ideas, the problem of adequacy of
syntax and semantics of L is solved if:
Well formed expressions of L belonging to the same syntactic category
correspond with their denotations, and more generally – with their two kinds
of references (meanings and denotations) that are assigned to them, which
belong to the same ontological, and more generally – to the same conceptual
and ontological category.
2.8. Algebraic structures of categorial language and its correlates
The essence of the approach proposed here is considering functors of lan-
guage expressions of L as mathematical functions mapping some language
expressions of S into language expressions of S and as functions which cor-
respond to some set-theoretical functions on extralinguistic objects – indices,
meanings and denotations of arguments of these functors.
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All functors of L create the set F included in S.
The systems:
L = 〈S ,F 〉 and ιL(L) = 〈ιL(S), ιL(F )〉
are treated as some syntactic algebraic structures, while the systems:
µ(L) = 〈µ(S), µ(F )〉 and δ(L) = 〈δ(S ), δ(F )〉
can be treated as some semantic algebras.
All these algebras are partial algebras4.
The functors of F differ from other, basic expressions of S in that they
have indices formed from simpler ones.
If e is a complex functor-argument wfe with the index a and its main
functor is f ∈ F and its successive arguments are e1, e2, . . . , en with indices
a1, a2, . . . , an, respectively, then the index b of f belonging to the set ιL(F )
is a functoral (complex) index formed from the index a and indices: a1, a2,
. . . , an of its successive arguments.
The index b of the functor f can be noted as the quasi-fraction:
ιL(f) = b = a/a1a2 . . . an = ιL(e)/ιL(e1)ιL(e2) . . . ιL(en).
We will show that indices, meanings and denotations of functors of the
set F are algebraic, partial functions defined on images ιL(S), µ(S), δ(S) of
the set S, respectively.
First we will note that in accordance with the principle (SC ) the main
functor f of e can be treated as a set-theoretical function satisfying the
following formula:
(Catf ) f ∈ Cata/a1a2...an iff
(f ) f : Cata1 × Cata2 × · · · × Catan → Cata & e = f(e1, e2, ..., en) &
(ι) ιL(f) : {(ιL(e1), ιL(e2), . . . , ιL(en))} → {ιL(e)} &
(PC1 ) ιL(e) = ιL(f(e1, e2, . . . , en)) = ιL(f)(ιL(e1), ιL(e2), . . . , ιL(en)).
4Ideas about the algebraisation of language can already be found in Leibniz’s papers.
We can also find the algebraic approach to issues connected with syntax, semantics and
compositionality in Montague’s ‘Universal Grammar’ (1970) and in the papers of van Ben-
them (1980, 1981, 1984, 1986), Janssen (1996), Hendriks (2000). The difference between
their approaches and the approach which we shall present here lies in the fact that carriers
of the so-called syntactic and semantic algebras discussed in this paper include functors
or, respectively, their suitable correlates, i.e. their ιL− or some other semantic-function
images. Simple functors and their suitable ιL−, µ− or δ− images are partial operations
of these algebras. They are set-theoretical functions determining these operations.
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On the basis of the principles of categorial agreement we can state that
semantic correlates of the functor f of the expression e are set-theoretical
functions too, and deduce that they satisfy the following conditions:
(Conf ) µ(f) ∈ Cona/a1a2...an iff
(µ) µ(f) : Cona1 × Cona2 × · · · × Conan → Cona &
(PC2 ) µ(e) = µ(f(e1, e2, . . . , en)) = µ(f)(µ(e1), µ(e2), . . . , µ(en));
(Ontf ) δ(f) ∈ Onta/a1a2...an iff
(δ) δ(f) : Onta1 ×Onta2 × · · · ×Ontan → Onta &
(PC3 ) δ(e) = δ(f(e1, e2, . . . , en)) = δ(f)(δ(e1), δ(e2), . . . , δ(en)).
2.9. Compositionality
The conditions (PC1 ), (PC2 ) and (PC3 ) are called the principles of composi-
tionality of syntactic forms, meaning and denotation, respectively (cf. Partee
et al. 1990; Janssen 1996, 2001; Hodges 1996, 1998, 2001). They have the
following scheme of compositionality (Ch) for the function h representing:
1) the function ιL, 2) the operation µ and 3) the operation δ:
(Ch) h(e) = h(f(e1, e2, , en)) = h(f)((h(e1), h(e2), . . . , h(en)).
The scheme (Ch) says that: 1) the index, 2) the meaning and 3) the
denotation of the main functor of the functor-argument expression e is a
function defined on 1) indices, 2) meanings and 3) denotations of successive
arguments of this functor.
The suitable variants of compositionality are some requirement of homo-
morphisms between the mentioned partial algebras:
L = 〈S ,F 〉
hom
−−−−→
ιL
ιL(L) = 〈ιL(S), ιL(F )〉,
L = 〈S ,F 〉
hom
−−−−→
µ
µ(L) = 〈µ(S), µ(F )〉,
L = 〈S ,F 〉
hom
−−−−→
δ
δ(L) = 〈δ(S ), δ(F )〉.
2.10. Concord between syntactic forms and their correlates
On the level of metatheory, it is possible to show the agreement between
syntactic structures of wfes of the language reality S and their correlates in
the conceptual reality C and in the ontological reality O.
As wfes have function-argument form : all the functors (all their corre-
lates) precede their arguments (correlates of their arguments as appropriate).
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Then the algebraic approach to language expressions corresponds to the tree
method.
Example. Let us consider two wfes of language of arithmetic:
a. 5 > 3− 2 and b. 3− 2 > −1.
First we present parenthetical recordings a’. and b’ for a. and b. and
diagrams of trees meant to explicate them. Diagrams Ta and Tb show a
natural, phrasal, natural functorial analysis of these expressions. The dotted
lines show functors.
Ta. 5 > 3 - 2
5 > 3 - 2
3 - 2
a’. (5) > ((3) - (2))
Tb. 3 - 2 > -1
3 - 2 > -1
3 - 2 - 1
b’. ((3) - (2)) > (- (1))
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


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
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
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B
B
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ppppppppppppppppppppp
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B
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Appropriate function-argument recordings af. and bf. and diagrams of
trees: Taf., Tbf. show “functional analysis” of expressions a., b. in Aj-
dukiewicz’s prefix notation.
Taf. 5 > 3 - 2
> 5 3 - 2
- 3 2
af. > (5, - (3, 2))
Tbf. 3 - 2 > -1
> 3 - 2 -1
- 3 2 - 1
bf. > (- (3, 2), - (1))
ppppppppppppppppppppp
A
A
A
A
ppppppppppppppppppppp
A
A
A
A
pppppppppppppp
B
B
B
BB
pppppppppppppp
B
B
B
BB
pppppppppppppp
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B
B
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Let us note that the functorial analysis of a. and b. given here provides
functional-argument expressions af. and bf.. It is unambiguously determined
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due to the semantic (denotational and intensional) functions of the signs
‘>’ and ‘−’: the first is a sign of two-argument operation on numbers, the
second one in a. denotes a two-argument number operation, while in b. it
also denotes a one-argument operation.5 The mentioned signs, as functors,
and thus as functions on signs of numbers, have as many arguments as their
semantic correlates have.
Comparison of tree method and algebraic method based on composition-
ality shows one-to-one correspondence of constituents of any wfe of L with
correlates in order to form and transmit our knowledge on reality O repre-
sented by L (see diagrams of trees Tbf . and Tb. of the expression b. and
corresponding to them diagrams of trees of categorial indices TιL(bf ) and
TιL(b) of b.).
Let us note that from the principle (PC1 ) and in accordance with the
principle (SC ), for e = f(e1, e2, . . . , en) ∈ S and ιL(e) = a, ιL(f) = b,
ιL(ei) = ai (i = 1, 2, . . . , n), we obtain, on the basis of our theory, the follow-
ing reconstruction of the rule of cancellation of indices used by Ajdukiewicz
(1935):
(rc) a/a1a2 . . . an(a1, a2, . . . , an) = a.
5Unambiguous “functorial analysis” is a feature of the languages of formal sciences. In
relation to natural languages the analysis depends on linguistic intuition and often allows
for a variety of possibilities (see e.g. Marciszewski 1981).
In this conception we do not state that “functoral analysis” of linguistic expressions
must be determined unambiguously but we accept the statement that it is connected with
expressions of a determined functor-argument structure.
Let us also note that traditional phrasal linguistic analysis, formalized by Chomsky
(1957) in his grammars of phrasal structures, takes into consideration grammatical phrasal
analysis and only two parts of functoral parsing of expressions.
Let us consider, for instance, the expression a. and its functorial analysis illustrated by
a derivation tree in Chomsky’s sense.
5 > 3 - 2
5 > 3 - 2
> 3 - 2
3 - 2
- 2
  
p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
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Tbf . 3 - 2 > - 1
> 3 - 2 - 1
- 3 2 - 1
bf . > (- (3, 2), - (1))
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The agreement between syntactic forms of wfes and their correlates is very
important whenever we want to know whether our knowledge represented in
language L is adequate to our cognition of reality.
Let e is any wfe of L and Ce is the set of all constituents of e. The concord
between syntactic structure of e and its correlates is possible because the tree
T (Ce) of constituents of e is isomorphic with trees:
T (ιL(Ce)) of indices of all constituents of e,
T (µ(Ce)) of all meanings of all constituents of e and
T (δ(Ce)) of all denotations of those constituents.
These trees are formally defined as graphs by means of the set Ce and
corresponding to it sets: ιL(Ce), µ(Ce) and δ(Ce) of all constituents that are
appropriate correlates of constituents of e. So,
T (Ce) = 〈Ce,≈>〉,
T (h(Ce)) = 〈h(Ce),≈>h〉 for h = ιL, µ, δ,
where ≈> is a linear ordering relation of an earlier syntactic position in e
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defined by means of the relation → of syntactical subordination (see Aj-
dukiewicz, 1960); ≈>h is h-image of the relation ≈>.
The mentioned isomorphisms of tree graphs are established by the func-
tions h mapping every constituent of e in Ce that occupies in e a fixed
syntactic position (place) onto its h-correlate that occupies in h(e) the same
position (place).
All notions introduced in this part can be defined formally.
Definition 1 (constituent of an expression e).
a. t ∈ C0e ⇔ e = t.
A constituent of the order zero of a given wfe e is equal to the expression.
b. t ∈ C1e ⇔
∃n≥1∃f,t0,t1,...,tn∈S (e = f(t0, t1, . . . , tn) ∧ ∃0≤j≤n(t = f ∨ t = tj)).
t is a constituent of the first order of a given expression e iff e is a functor-
argument expression and t is equal to the main functor of the expression
or to one of its arguments.
c. k > 0 ⇒
(
t ∈ Ck+1e ⇔ ∃r∈Cke t ∈ C
1
r
)
.
A constituent of k+1-th order of e, where k > 0, is a constituent of the
first order of a constituent of k-th order of e.
d. t ∈ Ce ⇔ ∃n t ∈ C
n
e .
A constituent of a given expression is a constituent of a finite order of
that expression.
Definition 2 (constituent of e with the fixed syntactic position).
a. t ∈ C
(j1)
e ⇔ e is a functor-argument expression ∧ t is the j1-th constituent
of C1e .
b. k > 0 ⇒
(
t ∈ C
(j1,j2,...,jk+1)
e ⇔ t is equal to the jk+1-th constituent of a
constituent of the set C
(j1,j2,...,jk)
e )
)
.
Definition 3 (relation of an earlier syntactic position in e).
a. s→ s′ iff ∃
k,j
s ∈ Cke ∧ s
′ ∈ Cje ∧ k ≤ j.
b. s ≈>s′ iff s→ s′ ∨(
∃j1,j2,...,jk,n,m (s ∈ C
(j1,j2,...,jk,n)
e ∧ s′ ∈ C
(j1,j2,...,jk,m)
e ∧ n < m)
)
.
s has in e an earlier syntactic position than s′ iff s, s′ are constituents of
e and either s has the order lesser than or equal to the order of s′ or s and
s′ are simultaneously constituents of some part e′ of e with the same order
k > 0 but s has in e′ the position n while s′ – the position m > n.
On the basis of the principles of compositionality it is easy to prove
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Theorem 1. For h = ιL, µ, δ
T(Ce) = 〈Ce,≈>〉
h
−−−−→
isom
T(h(Ce)) = 〈h(Ce),≈>h〉.
Uniformity of algebraic approach and tree approach allows to compare
knowledge reference to three kinds of realities and to take into account the
problem of its adequacy. It is connected with the problem of truthfulness of
sentences of L representing knowledge.
3. Three notions of truthfulness
3.1. Three kinds of models of language and the notion of truth
We have treated the language reality S and corresponding to it ιL−, µ− and
δ− images of S, i.e. ιL(S) – a fragment of the indexation reality I, µ(S ) – a
fragment of the conceptual reality C and δ(S ) – a fragment of the ontological
reality O as some algebraic structures, as some partial algebras.
Let us distinguish in S the set of all sentences of L. Models of L are non-
standardmodels. They are the three mentioned algebraic structures (partial
algebras) given as homomorphic images of algebraic structure L=〈S, F 〉 of
language L:
ιL(L) = 〈ιL(S), ιL(F )〉,
µ(L) = 〈µ(S), µ(F )〉,
δ(L) = 〈δ(S), δ(F )〉.
They are determined by the fragments ιL(S), µ(S) and δ(S) of the real-
ities I, C and O, respectively. The first of them ιL(L) is syntactic one and
the next two are semantic: µ(L) – intensional and δ(L) – extensional.
3.2. Three notions of truthfulness
For the three models ιL(L), µ(L) and δ(L) of the language L we define three
notions of truthfulness. For this purpose we distinguish three nonempty
subsets T ιL, Tµ, T δ of realities I, C and O, respectively:
• T ιL consists only of the index of any true sentences,
• Tµ consists of all meanings of sentences of L that are true logical propo-
sitions and
• Tδ consists of all denotations of sentences of L that are states of affairs
that obtain.
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Figure 3.
All of the three definitions of a true sentence in one of the models ιL(L),
µ(L) and δ(L) of L are analogous and are substitutions of the following
definition scheme:
Scheme of definitions (truthfulness): For h = ι, µ and δ
The sentence e is true in the model h(L) iff h(e) ∈ Th.
The definitions of a true sentence correspond to the truth value princi-
ple (cf. W. Hodges 1996). An expansion of the principle could be formulated
as follows:
The correlate of a sentence (i.e. its index, meaning or denotation, re-
spectively) determines whether or not it is true in a suitable model.
The three definitions of a true sentence can be given as follows:
• e is syntactically true iff ιL(e) ∈ T ιL,
• e is intensionally true iff µ(e) ∈ Tµ,
• e is extensionally true iff δ(e) ∈ Tδ.
From the above scheme of definitions of truthfulness of sentences we can
easily get the following scheme of theorems:
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Metatheorem 1. For h = ιL, µ, δ
If e, e′ are sentences and h(e) = h(e′), then
e is true in h(L) iff e′ is true in h(L).
Metatheorm 1 is the scheme of the following three theorems our formal
theory:
1) If we have two sentences with the same index then they are syntactically
true iff they have the same truth value in the syntactic model, i.e. their index
is the index of all true sentences,
2) If two sentences have the same meanings then they are intensionally true
iff they have the same truth value in the intensional model, i.e. their meanings
are true logical propositions,
3) If two sentences have the same denotation then they have the same truth
value in the extensional model, i.e. their denotations are the states of affairs
that obtain.
3.3. Reliability of cognition of reality
The main purpose of cognition is aiming at an agreement of truthfulness
of sentences that are results of cognition in all three models: ιL(L), µ(L) and
δ(L) (cf. Figure 3 ).
Let us note that if a sentence is true in the extensional model δ(L) then
it does not have to be true in the remaining models. So, in particular, a
deductive knowledge that is included in the conceptual reality C cannot be
in agreement with knowledge referring to the ontological reality O. There can
be true sentences in δ(L) that are not deduced from the knowledge accepted
earlier and cannot be true in the intensional model µ(L).
Considerations outlined in this paper point to a new aspect of the impor-
tance of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem (1931): it explains why language
cognition of reality illustrated by Figure 3 can be incomplete.
Justification of these statements requires introducing some new notions.
3.4. Operations of replacement
The most important theorems which follow from the principles of compo-
sitionality (PC1 ), (PC2 ) and (PC3 ) use the syntactic notion of the three-
argument operation π of replacement of a constituent of a given wfe of L. The
operation π is defined by means of the operation πn of replacement of the con-
stituents of n-th order. The expressions e′ = π(p′, p, e) and e′ = πn(p′, p, e)
are read: the expression e′ is a result of replacement of the constituent p,
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respectively, the constituent p of n-th order, of e by the expression p′. The
definition of the operation πn is inductive (see Wybraniec-Skardowska, 1991).
Definition 4 (operation of replacement). Let e, e′, p, p′ ∈ S. Then
a. e′ = π0(p′, p, e) iff p = e and p′ = e′,
b. e′ = π1(p′, p, e) iff e and e′ are some functor-argument expressions of the
set S with the same number of arguments of their main functors and differ
from one another only by the same syntactic position when in e occurs
the constituent p and in e′ occurs the constituent p′,
c. e′ = πk+1(p′, p, e) iff ∃q,q′∈S
(
e′ = πk(q′, q, e) & q′ = π1(p′, p, q)
)
,
d. e′ = π(p′, p, e) iff ∃n≥0(e
′ = πn(p′, p, e)).
We can define the operations of replacement h(π) for the correlates wfes
of S (h = ιL, µ, δ) in an analogous manner.
3.5. The most important theorems
In this part we will give some theorems of our deductive, formal-logical theory
of syntax and semantics. They are logical consequences of the above-given
definitions and principles of compositionality formulated earlier.
It is easy to justify three principles of compositionality with respect to
the operation π. They are a substitution of the following metatheorem:
Metatheorem 2 (compositionality with respect to π). For h = ιL, µ, δ
(PCpi) h(π(p
′, p, e)) = h(π)(h(p′), h(p), h(e)).
We can also easily state that the theorems that we get from the next
scheme are valid:
Metatheorem 3 (homomorphisms of replacement systems). For
h = ιL, µ, δ
〈S, π, T 〉
h
−−−−→
hom
〈h(S), h(π), h(T )〉,
where T is the set of all true sentences of L.
We can postulate that T ιL = ιL(T ), Tµ = µ(T ) and Tδ = δ(T ).
Now, we will present theorems called replacement theorems.
Fact 2. For h = ιL, µ, δ
If e = f(e1, e2, . . . , en), e
′ = f ′(e′1, e
′
2, . . . , e
′
n) ∈ S
then h(e) = h(e′) iff h(f) = h(f ′) and h(ei) = h(e
′
i) for any i = 1, . . . , n.
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By means of Fact 2 we can easily obtain the one fundamental syntactic
replacement theorem and two fundamental semantic replacement theorems
which are the suitable substitutions of the following metatheorem of our
theory:
Metatheorem 4 (replacement principles). For h = ιL, µ, δ
If e, e′ ∈ S and e′ = π(p′, p, e) then (h(p) = h(p′) iff h(e) = h(e′)).
So: Two expressions have the same correlate (the same categorial index –
the syntactic category, the same meanings, the same denotation, respectively)
if and only if by the replacement of one of them by the other in any wfe of
L we obtain a wfe of L which has the same correlate (the same categorial
index – the same syntactic category, the same meaning, the same denotation,
respectively), as the expression from which it was derived.
Corollary 1. If e, e′ ∈ S and e′ = π(p′, p, e), then
∃ζ(p, p
′ ∈ Catζ) iff ∃ζ(e, e
′ ∈ Catζ),
∃ζ(p, p
′ ∈ Conζ) iff ∃ζ(e, e
′ ∈ Conζ),
∃ζ(p, p
′ ∈ Ontζ) iff ∃ζ(e, e
′ ∈ Ontζ).
The next theorems are connected with the true value principles.
Metatheorem 5 (referring to the truth value principles). For h = ι, µ, δ
If e, e′ are sentences of L and e′ = π(p′, p′, e) and h(p) = h(p′), then
e is true in h(L) iff e′ is true in h(L) .
The three theorems that we get from the above metatheorem together
state that:
Replacing in any sentence its constituent by an expression which has the
same correlate (the same index, the same meaning, the same denotation,
respectively), never alters the truth value of the replaced sentence in the given
syntactic, intensional, extensional, respectively, model.
If we accept the following axiom:
Axiom: If e is a sentence and µ(e) ∈ Tµ, then δ(e) ∈ Tδ ,
then from the above metatheorem, for h = µ, we get:
Fact 3. If e, e′ are sentences, e′ = π(p′, p′, e) and µ(p) = µ(p′), then
if e is true in µ(L) then e′ is true in δ(L).
So: Replacing in any true sentence in the intensional model its constituent
by an expression that has the same meaning, we get a sentence which is true
in the extensional model.
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Stronger Metatheorem (referring to truth value principles)
For h = ι, µ, δ.
If e, e′ are sentences and e′ = π(p′, p, e), then
h(p) = h(p′) iff (e is true in h(L) iff e′ is true in h(L)).
The recognition of the above metatheorem requires accepting the three
axioms which are connected with Leibniz’s principles (cf. Gerhard 1890,
p. 280, Janssen 1996, p.463) and have the same scheme:
Scheme of Leibniz’s Axioms For h= ι, µ, δ.
If e, e′ are sentences and e′ = π(p′, p, e), then
if (e is true in h(L) iff e′ is true in h(L)) then h(p) = h(p′).
Leibniz’s Axioms together state that:
If replacing in any sentence its constituent p by an expression p′ never
alters the truth value of the replaced sentence in the syntactic, in the inten-
sional, in the extensional, respectively, model, then p and p′ have the same
categorial index, the same meaning, the same denotation, respectively.
Three theorems which follow from Stronger Metatheorem (referring to
truth value principles) together say that (cf. Hodges 1996):
Two expressions of the language L have the same correlates (the same
categorial index – syntactic category or form, the same meaning – intension,
the same denotation – extension, respectively), if and only if replacing one of
them by another in any sentence never alters the truth value of the replaced
sentence in the syntactic, intensional, extensional, respectively, model of the
language L.
4. Final remarks
• We have tried to give a description of meta-knowledge in connection with
three references of logical knowledge to:
– language,
– conceptual reality and
– ontological reality.
• Thanks to it we could define three kinds of models of language and three
kinds of truthfulness in these models.
• These models are not standard models; in particular the notion of truth
does not employ the notions of satisfaction and valuation of variables
used for formalized languages.
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• Adequacy of language knowledge to cognitive objects of reality is under-
stood as an agreement of truthfulness in these three models.
• It is possible to give a generalization of the notion of meta-knowledge in
communication systems in order to apply it to knowledge in text systems
but the solution of this problem requires more time and is solved by my
co-worker Edward Bryniarski.
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